Humanoid Robot Rents Fall 70% as Makers Accelerate Channel Push

Humanoid robot rents are plunging. According to reporting by Huxiu’s Embodied Commercial Outpost, the all-inclusive daily rental that stood at 10,000 yuan in early 2025 had fallen below 3,000 yuan by October this year. The case cited is Unitree’s U2, including technician support. The drop reaches 70%. It is not an outlier, but reflects increased supply across the market.

In early 2025, the all-inclusive daily rental for one humanoid robot was 10,000 yuan. By October this year, a Unitree U2 with technicians included fell below 3,000 yuan per day.

Meanwhile, manufacturers are accelerating channel development. On Oct. 9, UBTECH and C&D Inc. signed a strategic partnership agreement. The scope is not individual models, but covers sales networks, supply chains, financial leasing, maintenance and operations, and overseas markets. Falling rents and expanding channels are advancing in parallel. Supply has grown, but delivery and adoption capacity has not kept pace. The industry bottleneck has shifted from whether robots can be built to whether they can be deployed and operated.

Why Crashing Rents and Expanding Channels Coexist

The rent decline does not mean demand has disappeared. The direct cause is reduced scarcity amid rising supply. The 10,000 yuan price in early 2025 included the value of simply showing a moving humanoid machine. By October, similar units had multiplied, and merely showing one no longer commands payment. Falling below 3,000 yuan even with technicians shows pricing for the unit alone has collapsed. Operators have entered a phase of competing for orders through price cuts.

The UBTECH-C&D partnership responds to this phase. It goes beyond securing sales agents, covering supply-chain development, financial leasing, maintenance and operation systems, and overseas expansion. All support the process from delivery to sustained operation. A business model that ends with handing over the unit cannot keep robots running in the field. That is why manufacturers have begun to treat channels as infrastructure.

The role required of channels has also changed. Box-selling like conventional dealers is not enough. An intermediary layer is needed to turn machines that cannot be used straight out of the box into something that can be bought, used and repaired. That means combining display, rental, integration and repair. Without this layer, more supply will not lead to more adoption. Falling rents and expanding partnerships reflect the same structural shift.

640 Million Yuan via Dealers: Results and Limits

Dealer-based sales have moved beyond the conceptual stage. According to Unitree’s prospectus, core revenue in 2025 was 1.676 billion yuan, with offline sales accounting for 89.28%. Sales via dealers reached 640 million yuan, or 38.18%. The figures confirm external channels contribute to sales growth. Even a company with strong direct sales cannot manage without dealers.

But these results should not be equated with mature channels for humanoid machines. Unitree handles humanoids, quadrupeds and components together. Lower-priced, standardized products are close to what conventional dealers already handle. Quoting, inventory and maintenance procedures are easier to build. The more standardized a product, the closer channel work comes to selling goods. Auto 4S stores were viable precisely because bodies and servicing were standardized.

Humanoid machines are different today. UBTECH’s U1 series is positioned as ultra-bionic humanoids, priced from 119,800 yuan to 990,000 yuan. Use cases still need explaining, and usage is not established. In July, POS Group became UBTECH’s first authorized bionic humanoid partner for the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region. It will place the U1 series in auto stores to handle trials, rentals, deployment, standardized delivery and official maintenance. Stores only secure customer contact; final payment hinges on on-site operation and division of responsibility. The channel is distinctive in that it exists not to sell, but to make the product usable.

High Foot Traffic Yet Loss-Making Stores

Robot 4S, 5S and 6S stores have opened in quick succession across regions. Statistics show Beijing Yizhuang’s Robot Mall drew more than 100,000 visitors in its first year, with revenue exceeding 60 million yuan. More than 150 manufacturing partners joined. Its business goes beyond unit sales to contract development, rentals, finance and on-site adaptation support. It points to a channel model combining development, rental and finance. But no revenue breakdown is given, so it cannot be regarded as retail sales.

Another store highlights the harsh cost structure. At a robot 6S store in Guiyang visited by reporters in May, daily visitors peaked at 500 to 600. Even so, monthly revenue failed to cover total costs, leaving a shortfall of about 40%. Initial investment reached nearly 10 million yuan. Upstream suppliers demanded full prepayment. Labor costs for a staff of a dozen exceeded 100,000 yuan per month. Revenue still centered on product sales and rentals. Foot traffic does not translate directly into profit.

The difference lies in the industrial base. Yizhuang Robot Mall is backed by an industrial base that can combine exhibition, business attraction, development support and trials under one system. Independent commercial stores bear the cost of prototypes, rent, labor and repairs themselves. Profitability differs even under the same 6S banner. Equipment and spare parts across brands have low interchangeability. Rapid product upgrades can devalue prototypes before sale. Local technicians can handle only limited failures, with many units returned to factories. Stores bear inventory risk while handling demos, modifications, tuning and maintenance.

Turning Point From Scarcity to Field Capability

What has lost value as rents fall is the scarcity of the machines. Compensation for technical support has not fallen in tandem. Rental operators have shifted from earning on the novelty of the hardware to earning on staging, tuning and on-site response. Customer demand has also changed, from solo dances to group dances with a dozen or more units. Interest has also emerged in complex tasks such as folding clothes. The latter often requires new collaboration among body makers, arm makers and developers.

Group dances require fleet management and synchronization. Variations in movement must be curbed, with recovery procedures for falls. Folding clothes is even harder, requiring grasping, shape recognition and force control. A single manufacturer’s unit alone cannot complete it. Integration with arms, grippers and development processes is needed. Low rent alone does not win orders. The ability to run without failure on site has become the source of value.

This shift changes the role of channels. Channels increasingly serve as a product-complementing layer — proposing uses through displays, lowering failure costs through rentals, completing tasks through integration, and sustaining operation through repairs. The less mature the product, the heavier the customer-support burden. Without capacity to absorb it, losses grow with each project. Falling rents do not make channels unnecessary; they raise the value of complementary functions.

Technician Density Holds the Key to Scale

Channel success hinges on lowering technician density. If each additional delivery requires rewritten code, tuning and on-site staffing, the business remains project-based. Volume cannot grow without adding staff, and profits are absorbed by labor costs. Economies of scale emerge only when the same capabilities can be reused across brands and customers. Independence requires technicians to gradually step away from the machines.

Reusable assets are procedures, jigs and proven configurations. Standardized deployment procedures expand what local staff can handle. Common maintenance parts reduce factory returns. Remote monitoring and accumulated records also help, allowing failure modes to be classified and the line between local repair and return to be clarified. Cutting one-off rework changes the cost structure.

Manufacturers also bear heavy design responsibility. Stable interfaces, open diagnostics and documented repair procedures are needed. If specifications change too often, channels cannot keep up learning. Channels also bear the risk of prototype devaluation. The thicker the product-complementing layer, the more standardization is demanded of manufacturers. Lower technician density cannot be achieved by channels alone; it requires joint work by makers and channels.

Editorial Opinion

We expect rent-cut competition to intensify over the next three to six months. Channels will move more to offset revenue with demos and maintenance contracts. Makers will become more selective in channel support. Channels with capital and technicians will survive, while stores without them will exit in greater numbers.

In one to three years, the focus will be common deployment procedures and maintenance parts usable across brands. On-site staffing will recede first where standardization advances. Remaining complex tasks will settle as the specialty of integrators. The pace of standardization will set the pace of adoption.

As a question from the editors, who bears the cost of complementing a half-finished product remains open. If makers bear it, losses widen; if channels bear it, exits increase. Whether usage will mature to a level customers will pay for is the issue.

References

• “ 人形机器人租金暴跌，厂商为什么还在铺渠道？ “, by 具身商业前哨 — 虎嗅网, 2026-10-21T23:24:25.000Z (ARR)
• Source URL: https://www.huxiu.com/article/4899414.html?f=rss