Haima, ChuNeng Form R&D Joint Venture as Fringe Automakers Seek Survival

On Oct. 19, 2026, it was revealed that Haima and ChuNeng Passenger Vehicle had established a research and development company as a joint venture. The registered entity is Zhengzhou ChuJie Automotive R&D, with registered capital of 1 million yuan. Haima Automobile, a wholly owned subsidiary of Haima, contributes 51%, while Wuhan ChuNeng Passenger Vehicle contributes 49%. The legal representative is Qin Ming, who also serves as Haima’s legal representative and chief executive officer. The new company’s registered address is located inside the Haima Zhengzhou plant in the Zhengzhou Economic Development Zone.

According to reporting by Huxiu’s Auto Business Review, the joint venture is a contract-manufacturing framework aimed at utilizing idle production capacity. In China’s auto market, concentration among leading players is accelerating, leaving fringe companies struggling while holding factories and production qualifications. Asset disposals and moves to bring in funds continue at Zotye, Neta and WM Motor. This partnership is a typical example of such fringe players’ survival strategy.

This article is based on Huxiu (All Rights Reserved). It relies on fair quotation under Article 32 of Japan’s Copyright Act. It fairly quotes key points of the original while organizing the facts and background.

Factories, equipment, and production qualifications still remain in the hands of these companies.

As this sentence shows, transactions over the use of production resources continue. The outlook for mass production and funding remains uncertain.

Overview of the “ChuJie”

Establishment and Ownership Structure

The new company, Zhengzhou ChuJie Automotive R&D, is a small R&D company with capital of 1 million yuan. Haima holds 51% and ChuNeng holds 49%, with Haima taking the lead. Having Haima’s chief executive officer concurrently serve as legal representative is intended to clarify responsibility for management and production. Locating its registration inside the Haima Zhengzhou plant also reflects a setup premised on contract manufacturing.

According to Haima’s 2025 annual report, vehicle sales that year totaled 17,025 units, up 9.86% year on year. Overseas sales accounted for 16,811 units, up 13.69%, while domestic sales were 214 units, down 69.86%. Revenue for the same period was 1.849 billion yuan, up 4.17%. Sales of battery-electric vehicles were only 108 units, with sales revenue of 11.4884 million yuan.

Haima has passenger-vehicle production bases in Haikou and Zhengzhou with four processes: stamping, welding, painting and final assembly. The combined existing planned capacity of the two bases is 300,000 units. Sales in 2025 were equivalent to about 5.7% of that scale, highlighting extremely low utilization. Its own products are still under development, and the Haikou base is conducting demonstration operation of hydrogen vehicles. According to the annual report, the first batch of 50 Haima 7X-H vehicles has been completed. With domestic operations shrinking, it needs to sustain operations through contract orders.

Failed Huanggang Plan and Shift to Zhengzhou

The production base ChuNeng initially considered was in Huanggang, Hubei Province. The operating entity for the Huanggang base was Hubei Xinghui New Energy Vehicle, which previously produced WM Motor models. Hubei Xinghui’s production approval was obtained through the renaming and relocation of an existing company. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’s Batch 324 change notice proposal recorded a change from Dalian Huanghai Motor to Hubei Xinghui. Its registered and production addresses were to move from Dalian to Huanggang. Hubei Xinghui subsequently filed WM Motor-brand battery-electric models as a manufacturing company.

The Huanggang plant began operation in 2020, with Phase I planned capacity of 150,000 units. It had stamping, body, painting, final assembly, battery and other workshops, but halted production in 2022. While manufacturing conditions were in place, the company holding the production approval entered bankruptcy restructuring. Any deal would have had to include disposal of plant equipment, acquisition of company shares and repayment of legacy debts. Arrangements for the production approval failed to materialize, and the Huanggang plan collapsed.

ChuNeng then shifted to seeking manufacturing cooperation from Haima. The Zhengzhou base has a complete manufacturing system and experience in contract production for emerging brands. In 2017, XPeng selected the base, and the two companies signed a cooperative manufacturing framework agreement. Annual capacity of 50,000 units was initially promised. According to announcements at the time, XPeng was responsible for product definition and development methods, technical documents and parts supply. It licensed Haima to use its trademarks and related technologies. Haima was responsible for product announcement catalogue applications and organizing production. Facilities, equipment and staffing were also covered by consultations between the two companies.

XPeng later disclosed in listing documents that Haima handled day-to-day operation of the plant. XPeng itself was involved in the supply chain, production processes and quality control, and paid manufacturing fees based on vehicle volume. The partnership was based on a manufacturing contract and did not include establishing a joint R&D company. In 2021, the two companies decided not to renew the contract and signed a transition agreement for production termination and relocation. Haima undertook manufacturing work over several years, and XPeng achieved its initial deliveries. XPeng subsequently developed its own production bases. This time, a capital relationship has been added between ChuNeng and Haima. It may be a measure to address regulatory requirements.

WM Motor’s Two Plants and Stalled Restructuring

While ChuNeng cannot use the Huanggang base, production resumption at WM Motor’s other plant is also struggling. According to court announcements, the Huanggang Intermediate People’s Court ruled on Sept. 21, 2023 to accept restructuring of Hubei Xinghui. It appointed an administrator the next day, and subsequently published employee claims and confirmed claims in stages. The Wenzhou base was handled as a separate case. On April 3, 2025, the Shanghai No. 3 Intermediate People’s Court approved restructuring plans for four WM Motor-related companies. They covered four firms including WM Motor Technology Group and WM Motor Smart Mobility Technology Shanghai. Hubei Xinghui was not included.

In September that year, Shenzhen Xiangfei announced through WM Motor’s official channels that it had become a restructuring investor and new shareholder. It said it would initially invest 1 billion yuan to resume production of the EX5 and E5 in Wenzhou. It planned production and sales of 10,000 units in 2025 and 100,000 units in 2026. A year later, however, what appeared on WM Motor’s official account was content seeking wage payments. On Oct. 14, 2026, WM Motor’s official WeChat account posted a message asking for salary payments, which was soon deleted. According to insiders, payments stopped after January’s salary, with arrears exceeding half a year. Final-assembly production has effectively not resumed.

User services have also run into problems. According to an Oct. 16 report by the National Business Daily, the app “Xiaowei Suixing” could not be found in multiple app stores. WM Motor’s official website was also inaccessible, and some owners complained that remote-control and other functions were unavailable. The Wenzhou-related entities have an approved restructuring plan and announced the introduction of an investor. Still, there is no solid progress toward stable mass production and volume deliveries. Huanggang must handle its own restructuring and production arrangements separately, and cannot simply adopt the Wenzhou takeover model.

After a long suspension, resuming production also requires approval review. The “New Energy Vehicle Manufacturing Enterprise and Product Access Management Rules” designate companies that have suspended production for 24 months or more for special public notice. Before a company subject to special notice resumes production, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology must review whether it still meets access review requirements. This system made production arrangements in Huanggang even more difficult. ChuNeng failed to realize its initial production arrangement in Huanggang. The shift to Zhengzhou is also a result of such institutional constraints.

Zotye’s Asset Disposal and Overseas Strategy

That same autumn, Zotye was also advancing plans to survive. On Sept. 9, Zotye announced that the Wink Y01 international version had entered the trial-production stage. It said it was mainly targeting overseas markets. Rather than rebuilding its own domestic sales, it is seeking a lifeline in overseas demand.

On the financial side,補填 through asset disposals stands out. It deregistered production addresses in Daye and Xiangyang to obtain 200 million yuan in compensation. Net profit attributable to the parent for the first half was 80.39 million yuan. Excluding non-recurring gains and losses, however, it still posted a loss of 152 million yuan. Its core business profitability has not improved, effectively creating the appearance of emerging from deficit through one-off gains.

The Wink Y01 international version has entered the prototype stage, but the road to mass production is steep. Regulatory certification and securing funds remain uncertain. Small cars for overseas markets face fierce price competition and require building a supply chain. Compensation from deregistering production addresses is funding obtained in exchange for shrinking plants. It has limited resources to allocate to sustained development investment. Zotye’s revival remains a tightrope walk of asset sales and overseas orders.

Neta Restructuring Plan Rejected and

Funding Outlook

The restructuring plan for Hozon New Energy, Neta’s parent company, also drew attention. Investor Taiyi Shenglian proposed to invest 3 billion yuan. It would acquire a 70.62% stake. Existing shareholders would surrender their shares for free, with the possibility of receiving up to 8% of shares as a grant from the investor.

By Oct. 19, voting on the proposal was split. The investor group rejected the proposal. As the preferential creditor group and the general creditor group approved it, further coordination is needed. The allocation of existing shareholders’ rights, creditors’ recovery and the investor’s control became points of contention. Establishing the restructuring plan requires reconciling different interests.

Neta once had a certain sales scale and gained brand recognition. However, deteriorating cash flow forced it into restructuring proceedings. If a 3-billion-yuan-scale capital injection materializes, it would open the way to resume production and continue development. The rejection has shaken that premise. The focus is whether approval by creditor groups can be leveraged. Renegotiation with the investor group and revised terms may be needed. The timing of mass-production resumption is unpredictable.

Outlook for Fringe Players Amid Market

Concentration

In the first three quarters of 2026, the top 10 companies accounted for 84.5% of sales. As concentration among leaders advances in China’s auto market, production qualifications and factories alone cannot sustain operations. Partnerships such as those between ChuNeng and Haima are based only on idle capacity and production qualifications. Their weakness is the lack of proprietary technology or cost advantages. The outlook for mass production depends on continuity of orders and securing funds.

Fringe companies still hold factories, equipment and production qualifications. There are those who want to use them to enter vehicle manufacturing, those who seek recovery of old claims, and those waiting for production to resume. Partnerships and transactions around them continue, but the outlook remains uncertain. A grinding attrition, like cutting flesh with a dull knife, continues. Contract manufacturing supports utilization rates but cannot make up for the lack of development capability and sales networks. Shifting to overseas markets also faces barriers of certification and funding. Bringing in restructuring investment will not last without a mass-production track record. For now, it has no power to change the market structure.

Editorial Opinion

This joint venture is seen as a life-extension measure through contract manufacturing. Haima’s utilization rate remains below 6%, making it difficult to maintain facilities without orders. ChuNeng’s mass production also depends on securing funds and certification, with progress over the next six months to be tested. In the long term, concentration among leaders is expected to advance further. Dependence on contract work without proprietary battery management or intelligent-vehicle technology will leave it at a disadvantage in price competition. Trading factories and qualifications alone will not change the market structure. The remaining question is who will bear the losses. Without transparent handling of legacy debts and employee wages, new investment will not gather. Will re-examination of production qualifications move toward stricter enforcement. The alignment of regulation and the market is at issue.

References

• “ 藏在“楚界”里的求生欲：边缘车企的“钝刀子割肉” “, by 汽车商业评论 — 虎嗅网, 2026-10-20T23:09:10.000Z (ARR)
• Source URL: https://www.huxiu.com/article/4899094.html?f=rss